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INTRODUCTION'
On February 4, 2009, Senator Patrick Leahy introduced the Per-
formance Rights Act ("PRA") to the Senate, joined by Representative
John Conyers in the House of Representatives. Thirty-eight years after
sound recordings were first granted federal copyright protection against
unauthorized reproduction and distribution-and more than ten years
after gaining a limited digital performance right-legislation is pending
that would once again expand the scope of sound recording copyright to
encompass terrestrial radio broadcasts. Historically, such broadcasts
have been exempt from sound recording performance royalties.
Given the traditional exemption, the introduction of the PRA raises
several concerns. Some have suggested that an expanded sound re-
cording performance right is simply an attempt by record labels to
collect from a source with deep pockets.2 Others contend that the Act
corrects a copyright "loophole," fairly compensates artists, and injects
much needed capital into the sound recording industry.3 On another
level, however, the Act poses a more fundamental query. At a time when
consumers increasingly access music via online performance-based
websites like YouTube, MySpace, and Facebook, what are the long-term
implications of shifting reform focus from digital to terrestrial music
outlets?
Instead of (or in addition to) seeking remuneration from terrestrial
radio stations, this Note suggests that sound recording copyright holders
1. This Note is one of two works by the author to be published this year on music
copyright issues in the United States. While both works contain some overlap in the historical
analysis, each work addresses a separate and distinct issue. This Note examines the proposed
Performance Rights Act and suggests an alternative solution for the expansion of sound re-
cording performance rights online. The other work, titled Collective Management of Music
Copyright in the Digital Age: The Online Clearinghouse and scheduled for publication in
Volume 18 of the TEXAS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW JOURNAL, proposes a solution to
streamline music licensing in a digital era.
2. Performance Rights Act: Hearing on H.R. 848 Before the H. Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 111th Cong. 142, 144-46 (2009) [hereinafter Statement of Newberry to 111th Cong.]
(statement of Steve Newberry, President and CEO, Commonwealth Broadcasting Corporation)
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/hear_090310.html; see also Matthew S. Del-
Nero, Long Overdue? An Exploration of the Status and Merit of a General Public
Performance Right in Sound Recordings, 51 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 473, 475 (2004)
("The canon of legal scholarship on this subject is quite broad, with numerous observers hav-
ing addressed the lack of a general public performance right in sound recordings. ... There is
no known piece of domestic legal scholarship defending the status quo.").
3. See, e.g., DelNero, supra note 2, at 493-506; John R. Kettle III, Dancing to the
Beat of a Different Drummer: Global Harmonization-And the Need for Congress to Get in
Step with a Full Public Performance Right for Sound Recordings, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1041, 1044 (2002) (arguing that "granting copyright equality between the
sound recording and the musical composition is constitutionally sound, economically fair, and
is necessary for the United States to ... move closer to a desirable global harmony.").
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should seek to further expand their digital performance right to permit
collection of royalties from websites which regularly perform user-
generated audiovisual works. While such royalties would not be as lucra-
tive as those collected from terrestrial stations in the short term, such a
strategy would secure a right that will become increasingly valuable as
music distribution continues to evolve into an online, performance-based
platform. In consideration for an annual blanket fee, performance-based
sites would not be subject to costly Digital Millennium Copyright Act
notice-and-takedown proceedings or copyright infringement actions by
participating sound recording copyright owners. Such a compromise
would allow sound recording copyright holders and artists to receive just
compensation when their works are performed online, save sites like
YouTube millions in administrative and legal fees, and permit Internet
users to freely and fairly post audiovisual clips online.
This Note will attempt to reconcile the history of the sound re-
cording performance right with the recently introduced PRA, and
propose an alternative (or supplemental) strategy for further expanding
the right online. Part I summarizes in detail the background for the rights
involved with this topic. Part II provides a primer on the music licensing
process in the United States, placing particular emphasis on the tumultu-
ous brawl between sound recording copyright owners and webcasters.
Parts III and IV focus on the substance of and the political motivations
underlying the PRA. Finally, Part V describes the alternative proposal for
licensing performances of sound recordings online as introduced above,
suggesting a sustainable alternative to the PRA that would benefit con-
sumers and industry alike.
I. PRE-GAME SHOW
Before considering the details of the PRA, it is important to fully
understand the nature of the rights and parties involved. This section ex-
plains the differences between musical works and sound recordings and
details the development of sound recording copyright, from its roots in
1972 through current efforts for its continued expansion. Next, this sec-
tion explores the digital sound recording performance right, including
the numerous legislative and judicial proceedings that have attempted to
balance the needs of sound recording copyright owners and webcasters.
Such considerations are important to understanding the full effect that
the proposed PRA might have upon terrestrial radio broadcasters.
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A. Musical Works vs. Sound Recordings
Virtually all sound recordings embody two separate categories of
copyrightable works: the sound recording itself and the underlying musi-
4cal work. The copyright in the musical work (the lyrics and melody)
belongs to the author or composer of the song who typically assigns his
or her rights to a publisher for purposes of representation. 5 The publisher
then licenses the rights associated with the musical work to collective
organizations like the American Society of Composers, Authors, and
Publishers and the Harry Fox Agency (discussed in greater detail below),
which sublicense common commercial exploitations on behalf of the
copyright owner.'
Musical works are granted certain exclusive rights by statute includ-
ing the right to perform, reproduce, and distribute The most common
licenses obtained as a part of music distribution are performance and
mechanical licenses.8 As the name suggests, a performance license must
be obtained when a composition is performed publicly.9 A mechanical
license must be obtained when a composition is reproduced in the form
of a vinyl record, tape, or CD, and/or is distributed.'°
Over time, organizations developed to represent the collective inter-
ests of songwriters and publishers. Established in 1914, the American
Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers ("ASCAP") acts as an
agent of owners of copyright in musical works for the purposes of li-
censing performance rights." Broadcast Music, Incorporated ("BMI")
and the Society of European Stage Authors and Composers ("SESAC")
developed later and are the other dominant performing rights organiza-
4. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) (2006) ("Works of authorship include ... musical works,
including any accompanying words. ); § 102(a)(7) ("Works of. authorship include
sound recordings .... ).
5. DONALD PASSMAN, ALL You NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE Music BUSINESS 206-7
(6th ed. 2007); see also AL KOHN & BOB KOHN, KOHN ON Music LICENSING 107-57 (3d ed.
2002) (describing songwriter agreements with music publishers).
6. KOHN & KOHN, supra note 5.
7. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (3), (4) (2006).
8. See KOHN & KOHN, supra note 5, at 444-47.
9. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (explaining that to "perform" a work means to "recite,
render, play, dance, or act it, either directly or by means of any device or process" and to do so
"publicly" means to "perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any place where a
substantial number of persons... is gathered").
10. See PASSMAN, supra note 5, at 201. ("Even though devices haven't reproduced
sounds 'mechanically' since the 1940s, the name has stuck and the monies paid to copyright
owners for manufacture and distribution are still called mechanical royalties."). The Copyright
Act defines these physical embodiments of music as "phonorecords" 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defin-
ing a phonorecord as "material objects in which sounds ... are fixed by any method now
known or later developed....").
11. M. WILLIAM KRASILOVSKY ET AL., THIS BUSINESS OF MUSIC 145 (10th ed. 2007).
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tions ("PROs") in the United States today.'2 PROs generally issue "blan-
ket licenses" granting the licensee permission to perform all songs in
their music library for a fixed period of time.'3 The cost of a blanket
license for "general establishments," such as restaurants or bars, depends
on "seating capacity, frequency of music performances, type of rendi-
tion, admission charges, etc.' 4 Television and radio broadcasters also
pay large royalties to PROs, with rates based largely on gross advertise-
ment revenue.'5  Royalties are then distributed among member
songwriters and music publishers.' 6 Both ASCAP and BMI are subject to
court-ordered consent decrees requiring district court resolution of any
licensing negotiation stalemates.'7
Sound recording copyrights, on the other hand, are normally owned
by the artist or record label and protect the originality of the recording
itself as distinct from the underlying written lyrics or melody.'8 Thus,
there may be several different sound recordings based on numerous ver-
sions or covers of a single musical work.'9 The sound recordings
produced by artists are often deemed works made for hire in recording
agreements, granting all copyright interest therein to the record label.0
Despite this general practice, it is estimated that over 1,200 artists own
and actively manage the copyright in their own sound recordings.
2
'
12. Id. at 145-47.
13. Id. at 144.
14. ROBERT A. GORMAN & JANE C. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT: CASES AND MATERIALS
678 (7th ed. 2006).
15. KRASILOVSKY, supra note 11, at 145. PROs also offer a "per program" license to
television stations which differs slightly from the traditional blanket license. See KOHN &
KOHN, supra note 5, at 921-22.
16. KRASILOVSKY, supra note 11, at 145.
17. See United States v. American Socy. of Composers, No. 13-95, 1950 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1900 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 1950) (modifying ASCAP's original consent decree to in-
clude a rate court provision); United States v. Broadcast Music, Inc., No. 64 Civ. 3787, 1994
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21476 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 1994) (modifying BMI's original consent decree
to include a rate court provision similar to that of ASCAP's).
18. KOHN & KOHN, supra note 5, at 1312.
19. Id. at 1311-12.
20. KRASILOVSKY, supra note 11, at 27. This practice has resulted in significant contro-
versy, including whether sound recording artists may exercise termination rights. See Abbott
M. Jones, Get Ready Cause Here They Come: A Look at Problems on the Horizon for Author-
ship and Termination Rights in Sound Recordings, 31 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 127
(2008).
21. MusicFIRST, RADIO DISTORrION HANDBOOK VOL. 19-25, 8 (2009),
http://musicfirstcoalition.org/media/radio-distortion-handbook/Radio%20Distortion%2OBulletins%
20Vol.%2019-25.doc (last visited Jan. 17,2010) [hereinafter MusicFIRSTHandbook].
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B. The Emergence of Sound Recording Rights
In 1971, Congress first granted sound recordings federal copyright
protection." Thus, for the first time record labels and artists could license
their works.2 ' But this right was limited only to distribution and repro-
duction rights (requiring a master use license))" Broadcasters resisted the
imposition of an additional performance payment and argued that the
promotional consideration provided by free radio airplay fairly compen-
sated artists and labels." At the same time, PROs were concerned that
their share of the royalty pool collected from broadcasters would be di-
minished if they had to split performance right royalties with record
labels.26 The resulting alliance among PROs and broadcasters success-
fully blocked the addition of any sound recording performance right to
the 1976 Copyright Act.27
With the advent of streaming music on the Internet in the early
1990s, record labels made compelling arguments before Congress that
the traditional licensing structure inadequately protected and compen-
sated artists' interests. Streaming content threatened to displace the
historic revenue source of sound recordings, namely, the sale of physical
records. To quell such apprehension, Congress enacted the Digital Per-
formance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995 ("DPRSRA"), which
granted copyright holders the exclusive right "to perform the copyrighted
work publicly by means of digital audio transmission.' 30 But the Act only
encompassed "subscription" transmissions-meaning that ad-based or
22. Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (Act effective Feb. 15,
1972).
23. KRASILOVSKY, supra note 11, at 64.
24. KOHN & KOHN, supra note 5, at 1296-97. See KRASILOVSKY, supra note 11, at 69-
70.
25. KOHN & KoHN, supra note 5, at 1296-97.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See Bonneville Int'l Corp. v. Peters, 347 F.3d 485, 488 (3d Cir. 2003) ("The re-
cording industry was concerned that the traditional balance that had existed with the
broadcasters would be disturbed and that new, alternative paths for consumers to purchase
recorded music (in ways that cut out the recording industry's products) would erode sales of
recorded music.").
29. Id.; see S. REP. No. 104-128, at 13 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 356,
360 ("the Committee has sought to address the concerns of record producers and performers
regarding the effects that new digital technology and distribution systems might have on their
core business."); H.R. REP. No. 104-274, at 17 (1995) ("digital transmission services ... are
most likely to have a significant impact on traditional record sales, and therefore pose the
greatest threat to the livelihoods of those whose income depends upon revenues derived from
traditional record sales.").
30. Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act, Pub. L. No. 104-39, § 2, 109
Stat. 336 (1995); 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2006).
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free webcasts were not covered by the DPRSRA.31 As streaming tech-
nologies continued to advance, record labels lobbied Congress to expand
the scope of the Act further, culminating in a series of amendments as
part of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 ("DMCA").32 The
amendments differentiate between "interactive" and "non-interactive"
streaming transmissions.3 The distinction is based on the presumption
that the more interactive a music stream, the greater the chance that it
will displace physical sales of music that would traditionally generate
reproduction royalties. Purely interactive streaming music services,
where listeners may select which sound recordings they wish to hear,
present the highest risk for sale displacement, and thus require a digital
performance license negotiated directly with the sound recording copy-
right owner. Non-interactive services, like web radio, are subject to a
compulsory license, provided the streaming service complies withnumerus satutry " 36
numerous statutory requirements. Statutory royalties are paid to a non-
profit collective organization named SoundExchange, which distributes
royalties equally among artists and sound recording copyright holders.37
Finally, the amendments provided a limited number of exemptions from
the digital performance right altogether.38 Regardless of how such ser-
vices compensate the sound recording copyright owner for the digital
transmission, a performance license must still be acquired from the
musical work copyright owner (generally represented by PROs). 39
31. Kimberly L. Craft, The Webcasting Music Revolution is Ready to Begin, as Soon as
We Figure Out the Copyright Law: The Story of the Music Industry at War With Itself, 24
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 12-13 (2001).
32. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860
(1998); Craft, supra note 31, at 15-16.
33. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2-4).
34. KOHN & KOHN, supra note 5, at 1329.
35. Id. at 1332-33.
36. See § 11 4(d)(2) (requiring, for instance, that the transmission not provide a program
schedule in advance or induce the making of a phonorecord by the transmission recipient);
§ 114(f) (distinguishing between "subscription" and "non-subscription" non-interactive digi-
tal transmissions); § 114(d) (stating that the factors considered in determining whether a
subscription or non-subscription service qualifies for a compulsory license under § 114(f)
differ based on whether the non-interactive service existed prior to 1998 and uses the same
medium of transmission after that date that it was using before-if not, it is subject to in-
creased statutory requirements). Compare § 114(d)(2)(A-B), with § 114(d)(2)(A, C).
37. See SoundExchange, About, http://www.soundexchange.com/about (last visited
Jan. 17, 2010); 17 U.S.C. § 114(g)(2).
38. 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(1).
39. See § 114(d)(4)(B)(i).
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FIGURE 1
UNITED STATES MUSIC COPYRIGHT LICENSING STRUCTURE
Performance License
(No Compulsory License)
Right Licensed: Public Performance
Created By: Act of Jan. 6,1987 t
Managed By: BMI, ASCAP, SESAC
or individual publishers
Digital Performance License
(Parial Compulsory License)D --
IRight Licensed: Digital Performance
Created By: 1995 DPRSRA"
Managed By: SoundExchange, Record Labels, or
Artists 
Master Use License
(No Compulsory License)
Rights Licensed: Reproduction, Distribution
Created By: Act of Oct. 15,197 1
t
Managed By: Record Labels, Artists
*The Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995 and Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998
created a limited performance right in sound recordings, that applies to only to "digital audio transmission."
'Incorporated into the 1976 Copyright Act.
FIGURE 2
SOUND RECORDING DIGITAL PERFORMANCE RIGHT
LICENSING STRUCTURE
*Whether a subscription or non-subscription service qualifies for a compulsory license under § 114(f) depends on
whether the non-interactive service existed prior to 1998 and uses the same medium of transmission it used prior to
1998. If not, it is subject to heightened statutory requirements. Compare § I 14(d)(2)(A-B), with § I 14(d)(2)(A, C).
Note that this figure represents digital sound recording performance royalties only. Regardless of the level of
interactivity or subscription classification, a performance license must still be obtained from the musical work
copyright holder.
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C. Old Radio vs. New Radio
The 1998 DMCA amendments to the Copyright Act had the effect of
significantly limiting those digital transmissions that were excused from
paying a digital performance royalty.4° Of particular relevance to this
Note, nonsubscription broadcast transmissions were exempt from such
royalty payments.4' The immediate result of the amendment was a period
of ambiguity as to who or what it was that qualified for this exemption.42
Many terrestrial radio broadcasters, for instance, retransmitted their ana-
log performances over the Internet without compensating the sound
recording copyright owner. 3 Web radio stations (webcasters), on the
other hand, were placed in the precarious position of paying royalties to
both the musical work copyright owner and the sound recording copy-
right owner for their streaming performances.44 Sound recording
copyright owners argued that the broadcaster exception did not apply to
any Internet music transmissions, including terrestrial radio retransmis-
sions online.45
In 2000, the Copyright Office settled the dispute by ruling that re-
transmissions by terrestrial radio stations are non-subscription digital
transmissions that are not exempt from the sound recording digital per-
formance right. 46 The Copyright Office held that Congress' amendments
were intended to allow "for the continued transmission of an over-the-air
radio broadcast signal without regard to whether the transmission is
made in an analog or digital format."47 The report went on to suggest that
"Congress' intent would be thwarted if an FCC-licensed radio broad-
caster was allowed to transmit its radio signal over a digital
communication network, such as the Internet, without any restrictions on
the programming format.' 48 The Copyright Office's ruling was later up-
held by the Third Circuit.
49
D. Webcaster I and the Small Webcasters Settlement Act of 2002
Once it was established that all digital audio transmissions streamed
over the Internet were subject to the sound recording digital performance
40. Craft, supra note 31, at 19.
41. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(1)(A) (2006).
42. Craft, supra note 31, at 19.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 6
45. Id. at 7-8.
46. Copyright Office Rulemaking, Public Performance of Sound Recordings: Defini-
tion of a Service, 65 Fed. Reg. 77,292 (Dec. 11, 2000).
47. Id. at 77,301.
48. Id.
49. Bonneville Int'l Corp. v. Peters, 347 F.3d 485 (3d Cir. 2003).
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right, considerations turned to the statutory royalty rate. Both the
DPRSRA and DMCA amendments adopted a voluntary negotiation pe-
riod between copyright holders and webcasters followed by arbitration in
the event an agreement could not be reached.0 The arbitration power was
granted to a Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel ("CARP")5' instructed
to "establish rates and terms that most clearly represent the rates and
terms that would have been negotiated in the marketplace between a
willing buyer and seller."52 The determination of the panel was subject to
review by the Librarian of Congress and the Register of Copyrights.53
The statutory licensing process was first tested in July 1999 after ne-
gotiations broke down between a group of webcasters and the Recording
Industry Association of America ("RIAA").54 CARP released its royalty
rate determinations three years later, requiring webcasters to pay royal-
ties on a per-performance basis (i.e., a royalty must be paid each time a
sound recording is streamed to a listener)." In its ruling ("Webcaster I"),
CARP established royalty rates of seven-hundredths of a cent per per-
formance for commercial webcasters and two-hundredths of a cent per
performance for noncommercial webcasters 6 The Librarian of Congress
largely upheld the CARP determination on review."
The rates were met with fierce opposition by smaller webcasters,
who argued that the willing buyer and seller standard used by CARP was
far too broad to adequately differentiate between larger commercial
webcasters like Yahoo! and smaller mom-and-pop commercial web-
casters. 8 While many smaller streaming services were driven out of
business by the CARP rates, others lobbied Congress for help. Con-
gressional response was swift and resulted in the passage of the Small
Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002, which gave noncommercial and small
50. Erich Carey, We Interrupt This Broadcast: Will the Copyright Royalty Board's
March 2007 Rate Determination Proceedings Pull the Plug on Internet Radio?, 19 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 257, 268 (2008).
51. Originally, this body was tiled the Copyright Royalty Arbitration Panel (CRAP).
However, the acronym was deemed inappropriate and the title later changed. William Patty,
Why There Is No Copyright Royalty Tribunal, THE PATRY COPYRIGHT BLOG, (May 26, 2005,
1:10PM), http://williampatry.blogspot.conVm200/05/why-there-is-no-copyright-royalty.html.
52. 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(2)(B)(2006).
53. Determination of Reasonable Rates and Terms for the Digital Performance of
Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, 67 Fed. Reg. 45,240, 45,242 (July 8, 2002)
(codified at 37 C.FR. pt. 261) [hereinafter Webcaster 1].
54. Carey, supra note 50, at 276-77.
55. Webcaster 1, supra note 53, at 45,242.
56. In re Rate Setting for Digital Performance Right in Sound Recording and Ephem-
eral Recordings, Docket No. 2000-9 CARP DTRA 1 & 2 (Feb. 20, 2002), available at
http://www.copyright.gov/carp/webcasting-rates.pdf.
57. Carey, supra note 50, at 278.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 278-79.
The Super Brawl
commercial webcasters additional time to negotiate. 6° The Act authorized
SoundExchange to enter into "agreements on behalf of all copyright
owners and performers for the purpose of establishing an alternative
payment structure for small commercial webcasters. ' '6' This licensing-
rate standard was designed to incorporate "the unique business, eco-
nomic, and political circumstances of small webcasters. '62 Compromise
between commercial webcasters and SoundExchange was reached in
December 2002, with rates based on a percentage of the webcasters'
gross revenue.6 ' Noncommercial webcasters were subject to a flat annual
fee subject to certain restrictions.'
After four years of negotiation, arbitration, and Congressional inter-
vention, a temporary peace fell over the digital performance right
battlefield. The calm was short-lived, however, and in 2005, when the
negotiated license terms ended, the brawl began anew.
E. Webcaster H and the Webcaster Settlement Acts of 2008 and 2009
In 2004, Congress did away with the Copyright Arbitration Royalty
Panel system due to widespread complaints. In its place, three Copy-
right Royalty Judges were appointed to the Copyright Royalty Board
("CRB") by the Librarian of Congress.66 The CRB differs from CARP in
that rate determinations may be appealed only to the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit and not to the Librarian of
61Congress .
The newly-formed CRB was first called upon after negotiations be-
tween webcasters and labels broke down, and it released its royalty rate
determinations for the 2006-2010 licensing term on May 1, 2007
60. Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-321, 116 Stat. 2780
(codified as amended in scattered sections of Title 17).
61. Notification of Agreement Under the Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002, 68
Fed. Reg. 35,008, 35,008 (June 11, 2003).
62. Id. at 35,009 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(5)(C)).
63. Notification of Agreement Under the Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002, 67
Fed. Reg. 78,510, 78,511 (Dec.24, 2002) (stating "the royalty rate shall be 10 percent of the
eligible small webcaster's first $250,000 in gross revenues and 12 percent of any gross reve-
nues in excess of $250,000 during the applicable year, or 7 percent of the webcaster's
expenses during the applicable year, whichever is greater.").
64. Notification of Agreement Under the Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002, 68
Fed. Reg. 35,008, 35,010 (June 11, 2003).
65. General complaints of the panel included "CARP decisions are unpredictable and
inconsistent[, a]rbitrators lack appropriate expertise to render decisions and frequently reflect
either a 'content' or 'user' bias[, and t]he process is unnecessarily expensive." See H.R. REP.
No. 108-408, at 18 (2004).
66. Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-419, 118
Stat. 2341, 2341 (codified as amended in scattered sections of Title 17).
67. Carey, supra note 50, at 284.
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("Webcaster II").61 Using the willing buyer and seller model of Web-
caster I, the CRB adopted the rate-calculating procedures used in the
market for interactive digital transmission.69 As discussed above, interac-
tive services must negotiate licenses directly with sound recording
copyright owners for a digital performance license and are not subject to
statutory licensing or CRB arbitration in the event of deadlock. The
Board rejected a proposal to set sound recording performance royalties
equal to those of musical work performance royalties on the basis that
"evidence shows that sound recording rights are paid multiple times the
amounts paid for musical works." ° Considering the alternatives, the
CRB adopted the interactive market rate as the best benchmark for satis-
fying the willing buyer and standard.7' As in Webcaster I, the CRB
required webcasters to pay on a per-performance basis, with rates set at
one eight-hundredth of a cent per performance in 2006, eleven-
hundredths of a cent per performance in 2007, fourteen-hundredth of a
cent per performance in 2008, eighteen-hundredth of a cent per perform-
ance in 2009, and nineteen-hundredth of a cent per performance in
2010.72 The CRB's ruling was later upheld by the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit.
73
The reaction to the CRB rates was immediate and dramatic.74 Small
and large webcasters alike predicted the CRB rates would result in the
"end of Internet radio." For instance, Pandora Internet Radio ("Pan-
dora"), the largest and most successful online music webcaster,
maintained that it was "on the verge of collapse" as a result of the new
rates. 75 After the CRB's May ruling, it was estimated that webcasters
were required to pay roughly 50% of their annual $150 million revenues
in royalties.76 Pandora stated that it would have to pay nearly 70% of its
68. Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, Final
Determination of Rates and Terms, 72 Fed. Reg. 24,084 (May 1, 2007) (codified at 37 C.F.R.
pt. 380) [hereinafter Webcaster 11].
69. Carey, supra note 50, at 287.
70. Webcaster 11, supra note 68, at 24,094.
71. Id. at 24,095.
72. Id.
73. Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 571 E3d 69 (D.C. Cir.
2009).
74. Carey, supra note 50, at 291 ("These rate increases have proven so dramatic that
even the largest commercial webcasters have expressed an intention to cease webcasting op-
erations if the rates remain in effect.").
75. Peter Whoriskey, Giant of Internet Radio Nears Its 'Last Stand', THE WASHINGTON
POST, Aug. 18, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.comlwp-dynlcontentlarticle/2008/08/15/
AR2008081503367.html.
76. Id.
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income in sound recording performance royalties under the CRB rates.77
In contrast, cable and satellite providers of music pay digital sound re-
cording performance royalties in the amount of 6-8% of their
approximately $2 billion in annual revenues." Some scholars have sug-
gested that the CRB's misapplication of the willing buyer and seller
standard, along with the panel's adoption of the per performance royalty
payment structure, has threatened the viability of Internet radio.79
In an effort to alleviate the enormous pressure brewing between
webcasters and labels, Congress enacted the Webcaster Settlement Act
of 2008, sending the Digital Media Association ("DiMA," the national
trade organization representing webcasters) into negotiations with
SoundExchange. 0 While the Act gave the parties until February 15,
2009, to agree to licensing rates and terms, negotiations resulted in a
stalemate for many, leaving the future of Internet radio unsettled.8' In
May 2009, webcasters and sound recording copyright owners were given
additional time to negotiate with the introduction of the Webcaster Set-
tlement Act of 2009.2 Many webcasters, including Pandora, successfully
negotiated royalty rates under the Act that extend through 2015.3
F. Sound Recording Performance Rights in a Digital Market
As the foregoing discussion highlights, webcasters and sound re-
cording copyright owners have faced an uphill battle since passage of the
DPRSRA in 1995 and its subsequent amendments. Yet the industry is
beginning to adapt to the business realities of the digital sound recording
performance right. Webcasters today have come to understand the
77. Performance Rights Act: Hearing on H.R. 4789 Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 160
(2008) (prepared statement of Pandora Media, Inc.).
78. Id. at 27 (2008) (statement of Zoe Lofgren, Member, House Comm. on the Judici-
ary).
79. See Carey, supra note 50, at 292-94.
80. The Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-435, 122 Stat. 4974 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of Title 17).
81. Antony Bruno, No Deal Reached for DIMA, SoundExchange, BILLBOARD
MAGAZINE, Feb. 17, 2009, http://www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/content-display/industry/
e3iOa2ed4a24bf26fb8Ode3OfOb467a5e45.
82. The Webcaster Settlement Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-36, 123 Stat. 1926 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
83. David Oxenford, Pureplay Webcasters and SoundExchange Enter into Deal Under
Webcaster Settlement Act to Offer Internet Radio Royalty Rate Alternative for 2006-2015,
BROADCAST LAW BLOG, (July 7, 2009), http://www.broadcastlawblog.corn2009/07/articles/
intemet-radio/pureplay-webcasters-and-soundexchange-enter-into-deal-under-webcaster-
settlement-act-to-offer-intemet-radio-royalty-rate-altemative-for-20062015/ (noting that rates
were set at approximately 12-14% of annual revenue for smaller webcasters and the greater of
25% revenue or a per-performance royalty for larger webcasters (defined as those making
more than $1.25 million in revenue annually)).
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challenges of establishing an Internet radio business where both musical
work and sound recording performance royalties are a necessary and
foreseeable expense. The right to broadcast sound recordings online is
no longer free, and the stage is set for sound recording copyright owners
to expand their digital right even further.
II. SOUND RECORDING COPYRIGHT OWNERS' NEW BATTLE
As the battle with webcasters over digital performance royalties con-
tinues, sound recording copyright owners have turned their attention to
terrestrial radio broadcasters. These sound recording performance rights
have been pursued before-sound recording copyright holders have lob-
bied for legislative adoption of such rights more than twenty-four times
since 1926. 4 It wasn't until 1995 that Congress finally heeded the calls
of sound recording copyright owners and granted a partial performance
right, being careful to preserve the traditional relationship between the
record companies and the radio broadcasters.85 With the introduction of
the PRA it would appear that record labels are seeking to drastically re-
define their relationship with terrestrial music broadcasters.
A. The Proposed Performance Rights Act
The PRA, in its current form, was first introduced in 2007, but failed
to garner sufficient votes to pass in the House in 2008.86 On February 4,
2009, S. 379 and H.R. 848 were reintroduced in both the House and Sen-
ate.8' The bill expands the scope of § 106(6) of the Copyright Act to
include performances made publicly "by means of an audio transmis-
sion," thereby encompassing terrestrial AM/FM broadcasts.88 Like
non-interactive webcasters, terrestrial radio stations would be subject to
statutorily prescribed royalty rates under § 114 of the Copyright Act,
which would be set at a later date by the Copyright Royalty Board. 9 In
an attempt to eliminate regulatory burdens for terrestrial stations, the
84. DelNero, supra note 2, at 475.
85. S. REP. No. 104-128, at 15 (1995).
86. See Anne Mullins, Shenanigans: Good News for MusicFIRST, POLITIco, Apr.
2, 2009, http://www.politico.comblogs/anneschroeder/0409/Shenanigans-GoodNewsfor_
MusicFIRST_.html (quoting NAB Executive Vice President Dennis Wharton, an opponent to
the PRA, "It's not a big surprise if it gets out of committee; our goal is to get more than half
the members of the House to oppose the bill-like they did last year.").
87. Performance Rights Act, H.R. 848, S. 379, 111 th Cong. (2009).
88. H.R. 848 § 2(a); S. 379 § 2(a).
89. H.R. 848 § 2(c); S. 379 § 2(b).
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PRA also eliminates many of the statutory requirements applicable to
webcasters. 9°
In lieu of statutory rates, smaller commercial broadcast stations
whose annual gross revenues are less than $1,250,000, may pay an an-
nual royalty fee of $5,000.9' Under the Senate Judiciary Committee's
version of the bill, commercial stations with annual revenues of less than
$500,000 would pay only $2,500 per year, with further graduated reduc-
tions for stations grossing less than $100,000 annually.92 According to
one estimate, nearly 80% of radio stations operating in the United States
today would qualify for a flat, annual rate. 93 Similarly, nonprofit broad-
casting entities and college radio stations would be subject to an annual
fee of $1,000. 94 Stations that make only incidental uses of sound re-
cordings, like talk radio stations and religious broadcasts, would be
completely exempt under the Act.95 At the House hearings in March
2009, the Chairman of the RIAA emphasized that those broadcast sta-
tions that show a "great deal of promotion" for sound recordings would
also be granted a royalty discount in line with preexisting statutory
• • 96
guidelines. The bill also ensures that, regardless of recording agree-
ments, artists and musicians receive 50% of all performance royalties
collected from stations.97 The other 50% of collected royalties would be
distributed to the sound recording copyright owner, which, in thousands
of instances, is also the artist.98
Those in support of the bill include the RIAA, SoundExchange, and
the MusicFIRST Coalition (which includes twelve affiliated sound
recording organizations).99 The main entity opposing the bill is the Na-
tional Association of Broadcasters ("NAB"), representing small and
90. S. 379 § 2(d).
91. H.R. 848 § 3(a)(1); S. 379 § 3(a)(1).
92. S. 379 § 3(a)(1).
93. Performance Rights Act: Hearing on H.R.848 Before the H. Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 11 th Cong. 193 (2009) [hereinafter Statement of Bainwol] (statement of Mitch Bainwol,
Chairman and CEO, Recording Industry Association of America), available at http://
judiciary.house.gov/hearings/hear_0903 10.html.
94. H.R. 848 § 3(a)(1)
95. Id. at § 3(b).
96. Statement of Bainwol, supra note 93, at 197; see 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(2)(B) ("Such
[CRB] rates and terms shall distinguish among the different types of eligible nonsubscription
transmission services ... based on criteria including ... [whether the use] may promote the
purchase of phonorecords by consumers.").
97. See S.379 § 5; 17 U.S.C. § 114(g)(2)(A).
98. See S.379 § 5; 17 U.S.C. § 114(g)(2)(A); see MusicFIRST Handbook, supra note
21, at 8.
99. For more information on the organizations, see MusicFIRST, http://
www.musicfirstcoalition.com (last visited Jan. 17, 2010); Recording Industry Association
of America, http://www.riaa.com (last visited Jan. 17, 2010); SoundExchange, http://
www.soundexchange.com (last visited Jan. 17, 2010).
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large broadcasters nationwide. NAB has created an online radio coalition
at NoPerformanceTax.org.'0 At the time of writing, the bill has been re-
ported out of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees and is pending
full floor votes in both houses.'0 '
B. The Long Road to Sound Recording Equality
As discussed above, powerful broadcasting and PRO lobbyists
fought against the imposition of an additional performance right in the
1976 Act. However, this alone does not account for the seemingly lop-
sided statutory scheme. After all, sound recording copyright owners are
represented by equally powerful lobbyists. The RIAA, for instance,
represents nearly 85% of sound recording copyright owners in the
United States, which is as large as or larger than any musical work trade
association.' 2 What, then, accounts for the performance right disparity?
The answer is that broadcasters have continually convinced Congress
that radio airplay constitutes free advertising for sound recordings.'
0 3
Consumers were considered more likely to purchase music if they heard
new songs via radio, and thus a symbiotic relationship was said to have
existed between record labels and broadcasters-free promotion was
exchanged for free use of sound recordings."
One important threshold issue which must therefore be considered is
whether the promotional value of radio airplay continues to fairly com-
pensate sound recording copyright owners in the digital era. This
fundamental issue was debated at the hearings before the House Sub-
committee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property in 2008 and
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary in 2009.05
100. See No Performance Tax, http://www.noperformancetax.org (last visited Jan. 17,
2010).
101. See GovTrack.us, S.379, Performance Rights Act available at http://www.govtrack.us/
congress/bill.xpd?bill=sl 11-379 (last visited Jan. 17, 2010); GovTrack.us, H.R. 848, Perform-
ance Rights Act, available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=hlll-848 (last
visited Jan. 17, 2009).
102. See Statement of Bainwol, supra note 93, at 194 n.1.
103. See S. Rep. No. 93-983, at 225-26 (1974) ("For years, record companies have gra-
tuitously provided records to stations in hope of securing exposure by repeated play over the
air. The financial success of recording companies and artists who contract with these compa-
nies is directly related to the volume of record sales, which in turn depends in great measure
on the promotion efforts of broadcasters.").
104. Carey, supra note 50, at 264-65.
105. See generally, Performance Rights Act: Hearing on H.R.4789 Before the Subcomm.
on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th
Cong. (2008) [hereinafter PRA Hearings Before 110th Congress], available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/lhearings/hear_061108.html; Performance Rights Act: Hearing on
H.R. 848 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009) [hereinafter PRA
Hearings Before 111th Congress], available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/hear-
090310.html.
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C. Terrestrial Radio's Use of Sound Recordings:
Taking vs. Promotion
In this battle, those for and against the bill frame the equities at stake
in two very different lights. Speaking on behalf of broadcasters at the
2009 hearing before the House Committee on the Judiciary, NAB argued
that studies show a direct correlation between the number of spins or
plays on the local radio and the sales of albums and singles resulting in
approximately $1.5-2.4 billion in free promotion annually. ' Emphasiz-
ing the symbiotic relationship between the two groups, NAB maintained
that the publicity gained by artists in terms of record sales, digital
downloads, tour promotion, and merchandise sales more than adequately
compensates artists for the stations' use of sound recordings. '
Record labels, on the other hand, deny the existence of any symbi-
otic relationship. Mitch Bainwol, chairman of the RIAA, noted that "the
argument that this is symbiotic ... we don't get to participate in this
question of balance. They get to take our property, use it, and we can't
say no. They call it symbiotic; I call that a taking."' 8 While conceding
that terrestrial radio stations undoubtedly contribute some promotional
value, supporters of the PRA like Bainwol nevertheless contend that
digital technology has significantly affected the value of traditional radio
promotion.' Whereas the listening public once had limited access to
106. Statement of Newberry, supra note 2, at 147.
107. Id. at 147-52. Interestingly, NAB made the same argument when ASCAP sought to
collect performance royalties for musical works in the 1920s. WILLIAM H. YOUNG & NANCY
K. YOUNG, MUSIC OF THE WORLD WAR II ERA, 91 (Greenwood Publishing Group 2008)
("broadcasters replied [to ASCAP's royalty demands] that spinning a disc on the air equaled
free advertising, caused listeners to purchase the recording, and therefore required no roy-
alty."). In the landmark case M. Witmark & Sons v. L Bamberger & Co., the court dismissed
radio broadcasters' claim that promotional consideration adequately compensated the musical
work copyright owner. 291 Fed. 776, 779-80 (D.N.J. 1923). While the court ultimately found
the argument to be "immaterial" to a claim of infringement, it nonetheless went on to con-
demn the proposition, finding that:
The defendant [broadcaster] argues that the plaintiff should not complain of broad-
casting of its song because of the great advertising service thereby accorded to the
copyrighted number.... But the copyright owners and the music publishers them-
selves are perhaps the best judges of the method of popularizing musical selections.
There may be various methods of bringing them to the attention of music lovers. It
may be that one type of song is treated differently than a song of another type. But,
be that as it may, the method, we think, is the privilege of the owner.
Id. at 779-80.
108. Statement of Bainwol, supra note 93, at 247. Note that while it is debatable whether
sound recording broadcasts are "takings" given the lack of a performance right, broadcasters
have seemingly conceded the point, at least from a legal perspective, given their consideration
argument in the first instance. In other words, if there is no applicable property right in sound
recordings, why are broadcasters debating the sufficiency of their consideration?
109. See id.
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new music outside of terrestrial radio broadcasts, consumers are
becoming increasingly exposed to music via digital performances by
satellite radio broadcasts and webcasts, both of which pay sound re-
cording performance royalties." ° There is no reason, Bainwol argues, for
terrestrial radio to continue to enjoy a performance right exemption
when Internet and satellite stations do not. Furthermore, broadcasters'
promotional consideration argument significantly overlooks older songs
that are still regularly performed on terrestrial radio but derive little to no
promotional value from radio airplay."'
Broadcasters also argue that, promotion aside, record labels' calls for
equal rights in sound recordings are disingenuous. Under the PRA, copy-
right holders are not seeking rights equal to those granted to musical
works. By seeking only to collect from the largest radio broadcasters,
and effectively exempting the smaller ones, NAB argues that the re-
cording industry is attempting to "siphon funds from the coffers of the
top 25 percent of radio broadcasters into a recording industry suffering
from flagging revenues due to piracy and an antiquated business
model.""' Indeed, roughly 80% of broadcasters would be covered by an
annual $5,000 cap on royalty payments, designed to protect smaller sta-
tions. ' 3 Moreover, unlike musical works, public performances of sound
recordings at commercial establishments like restaurants, bars, and
nightclubs would not be subject to royalty payments under the Act.
110. Id. (statement of Brad Sherman, Member, House Comm. on the Judiciary).
111. Posting of Jonathan Lamy to RIAA Music Notes Blog, http:lwww.riaa.corn/
blog.php?content selector=Techdirt-On-Performance-Rights-Act (June 17, 2009) ("[Y]es, this
legislation would benefit Britney Spears. But more importantly, it would finally provide some
recognition to the slew of Motown greats whose hits have been routinely played on radio but
who earn nothing and who derive little promotional value from radio airplay.").
112. Statement of Newberry, supra note 2, at 155.
113. Statement of Bainwol, supra note 93, at 197.
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TABLE 1
COMPARISON OF PERFORMANCE RIGHTS
SOUND RECORDING MUSICAL WORK
PERFORMANCE LICENSE PERFORMANCE LICENSE
MUSIC PROVIDER REQUIRED? REQUIRED?
Cable/Satellite Yes--6-8% percent of gross Yes
revenues
Yes-Commercial webcasters pay
Internet Radio .18o per performance in 2009 Yes
(unless otherwise negotiated)
Terrestrial Broadcasters No Yes
(pre-PRA)
Terrestrial B oadcasters Yes-$5,000 for approx. 75% of(post-PRA) stations, statutory rate TBD for Yes
larger stations
Commercial Establishments
(Bars, Restaurants, etc.) No Yes
(pre-PRA and post-PRA) I I
In response, sound recording copyright owners acknowledge that a
full sound recording performance right is justified, but note that their
progress has been incremental and that if exemptions are "the price of
gaining a minimum level of protection for the future, we are willing to
pay it. '""4 On a more fundamental level, the broadcasters' argument erro-
neously assumes that complete musical work parity is a prerequisite for
sound recording copyright protection."' Additionally, the argument con-
tradicts broadcasters' more fundamental proposition that musical works
and sound recordings are entirely different works of authorship, and that
exclusive rights granted to each cannot be meaningfully compared."
6
Finally, copyright holders highlight that the United States is one of
the only industrialized nations in the world that does not provide sound
114. Lamy, supra note 111 (quoting former RIAA CEO Jay Berman).
115. See discussion infra Part IV.D.
116. See NoPerformanceTax.org, About the Issue, http://www.noperformancetax.org/
issue.asp (last visited Jan. 17, 2010) ("It's widely understood that songwriters do not have the
same name recognition to financially exploit themselves to make money. Performers can make
money from touring and personal appearances, merchandise and other licensing and branding
opportunities like perfume and clothing lines.").
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recordings with a general performance right." 7 Because of this disparity,
American performers and sound recording copyright owners are not enti-
tled to performance royalties collected overseas due to international
treaty reciprocity requirements."' It is estimated that over $600 million
in performance royalties have gone uncollected because of the United
States' lack of a full sound recording performance right." 9 However,
broadcasters maintain that foreign jurisdictions provide fundamentally
different rights to sound recordings, that radio exists under an entirely
different operating framework in many parts of the world, and that it is
therefore improper to compare the rights offered by foreign countries to
those granted in the United States. 120 Other legal commentators have
noted that foreign royalties may be overstated, and that other countries
might opt-out of international performance right obligations should the
United States ever seek to collect foreign royalties. 21
D. Record Label Bailout
Throughout this debate, the National Association of Broadcasters,
along with several members of Congress, have argued that the PRA is
nothing more than an attempt by record labels to recoup lost profits from
a source with deep pockets. 22 Globally, recorded music sales have
plummeted nearly 20% since 2000, with signs of increased losses in re-
cent years. 3 Since 1997, record sales have dropped over 40% in the
United States alone. 24 The music industry remains in turmoil despite
117. Statement of Bainwol, supra note 93, at 195; see also DelNero, supra note 2, at
191-92.
118. Statement of Bainwol, supra note 93, at 195; see also DelNero, supra note 2, at
191-92.
119. KRASILOVSKY, supra note 11, at 65.
120, JANE MAGO, BENJAMIN IVINS, & SUZANNE HEAD, SHOULD THE U.S. LEAD OR
FOLLOW? WHY OTHER COUNTRIES' IMPOSITION OF A TAX ON THE PERFORMANCE OF SOUND
RECORDINGS DOES NOT JUSTIFY SUCH A U.S. TAX, March 2009, available at http://
www.freeradioalliance.org/International-Performance-Tax-Paper.pdf (arguing, for instance,
that many radio stations are government-owned or subsidized in foreign countries that collect
sound recording performance royalties).
121. DelNero, supra note 2, at 191-192; Emily F Evitt, Money, That's What I Want: The
Long and Winding Road to a Public Performance Right in Sound Recordings, 21 INTELL.
PROP. & TECH. L.J. 10, 11 (2009).
122. See NoPerformanceTax.org, About the Issue, http://www.noperfonnancetax.org/
issue.asp (last visited Jan. 17, 2010).
123. Measured by the total percentage change in the value of recorded world music sales
between 2000 and 2007. International Federation of the Phonographic Industry, Music Market
Statistics, http://www.ifpi.org/content/section-statstics/index.html (follow individual "Re-
corded Music Sales" hyperlinks for each of the years 2000-2007).
124. This percentage represents the difference in the number of CD, cassette, LP/EP, and
digital album units shipped between 1997 and 2007. Recording Industry Association of Amer-
ica, Recording Industry, 2007 U.S. Manufacturers' Unit Shipments and Value Chart, available
at http://76.74.24.142/81128FFD-028F-282E-ICE5-FDBF16A46388.pdf.
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infringement actions brought on behalf of copyright owners attempting
to combat the effects of illegal music distribution.'2 With these consid-
erations in mind, Congressman Ric Keller argued at the 2008 House
hearings that record labels are hurting for two principal reasons: online
piracy and an antiquated business model. He made it clear, however, that
"these two things that are hurting the music industry were not caused by
broadcasters.' 26
The effect of illegal digital music distribution was squarely ad-
dressed in the 2009 House hearing on the PRA.' Representative Charles
Gonzalez from Texas asked both Steven Newberry and Mitch Bainwol
why the PRA was of such crucial importance to record labels now.'28 Mr.
Newberry answered that record labels have lost millions as a result of
online piracy and that they are thus seeking to recoup such losses by go-
ing after only the most successful terrestrial broadcasters.' 29 Mr. Bainwol
refuted such assertions, arguing that online use and distribution of music
has served only to "dramatize" the inherent inequity in the music licens-
ing structure. 3° He contended that consumers increasingly access music
via performances on the Internet, thus cutting off one of the largest
sources of record label income-reproduction and distribution royal-
ties.' "If we care about creativity," Bainwol argued, "we've got to find a
way to connect to the emerging model.'
32
This argument seems to undercut record labels' demand for artist
equality. If this legislation is really about connecting to the emerging
model online, why should terrestrial radio stations foot the bill while
labels scramble to keep up with digital market trends? After all, terres-
trial broadcasters can hardly be responsible for emerging online
consumer behavior. Mr. Bainwol went on to argue that "in that context
[of the emerging online performance model], having the single biggest
platform enjoy a benefit relative to Pandora, relative to Real Networks,
relative to any of the other DiMA companies, makes absolutely no
125. See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913
(2005); In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003); A&M Records, Inc.
v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Mark F. Schultz, Fear and Norms and
Rock & Roll: What Jambands Can Teach Us About Persuading People To Obey Copyright
Law, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 651, 661 (2006) ("The RIAA's experience with its lawsuits has
echoed the general experience with such deterrence-based strategies: they are enthusiastically
pursued but not necessarily effective.").
126. PRA Hearings Before 110th Congress, supra note 105, at 26 (statement of Ric
Keller, Member, House Comm. on the Judiciary).
127. PRA Hearings Before I I I th Congress, supra note 105, at 246-47.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 246.
130. Id. at 247.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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sense."'33 But terrestrial broadcasters quite clearly do not enjoy a benefit
in the context of the emerging performance market online. If terrestrial
broadcasters want to stream music on the Internet, they have to pay a
digital performance royalty per the 2000 Copyright Office determina-
tion."4 For the sake of consistency, then, labels should focus on the fact
that like terrestrial radio, web and satellite broadcasts of sound re-
cordings also promote artists' music and yet are both subject to digital
performance royalties. Even if it were true that terrestrial radio better
promotes sound recordings than Internet radio does today, it is extremely
likely that web radio will provide more promotional value than its terres-
trial peers in the future.'35 Indeed, industry projections estimate that by
2020, Internet radio will trail terrestrial radio listenership by as little as
50,000 listeners per week.3 6 What then will account for the inequity?
Surely, labels could argue, it should be in the discretion of a copyright
holder to determine which promotional uses should be permitted, online
and off.'33 Finally, the argument that labels are seeking an expanded per-
formance right primarily because of current economic troubles is
undermined by the fact that the recording industry has fought legisla-
tively for the right over two dozen times since 1926.138
III. AN ALTERNATE SOLUTION-"ASCAPING"
SOUND RECORDINGS ONLINE
As physical record sales continue to decline, one can't help but rec-
ognize that sound recording performance royalties represent a largely
untapped source of compensation. With the increasing prevalence of
digital music performances, however, it is questionable how long even
terrestrial radio performance royalties could adequately encourage crea-
133. Id.
134. Public Performance of Sound Recordings: Definition of a Service, 65 Fed. Reg.
77,292 (Dec. 11, 2000) (to be codified at 37 C.ER. pt. 201).
135. See BRIDGE RATINGS, DIGITAL MEDIA GROWTH PROJECTIONS, Apr. 25, 2007,
http://www.bridgeratings.com/press_042507-digitalprojectionsupd.htm.
136. Id.
137. See William H. O'Dowd, The Need for a Public Performance Right in Sound Re-
cordings, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 249, 264-65 (1994) ("even if we assumed that increased
exposure through digital audio broadcast and cable services would improve record sales, that
would not automatically lead to the conclusion that copyright owners should be denied the
right to authorize those transmissions."); see also Michael 0. Sutton, ed., Annual Report,
1990-1991 A.B.A. SEC. PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. 187, 188 ("it can be said that the
authors of The Hunt for Red October or The Color Purple were 'benefitted' by the release of
the movie versions of those books, but few would argue that those authors should not also be
compensated for these visual performances as well.").
138. DelNero, supra note 2, at 475.
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tivity.'39 Mitch Bainwol was entirely correct when he warned that his in-
dustry must connect to the emerging performance market. However, this
market is online and represents a fundamental shift in the way consum-
ers access music. Mr. Bainwol failed to identify that performances
accessed via popular music sites like YouTube, Myspace, and Facebook,
among others ("Performance-Based Sites"), would fall outside the pur-
view of sound recording performance royalties even if the proposed bill
should pass. Thus, in the interests of sustainable licensing revenues,
sound recording copyright owners must adopt a strategy that better con-
nects to online distribution platforms.'"
A circumspect assessment of the performance right licensing land-
scape should naturally focus on the behemoth U.S. musical work
performing rights organizations. These collectives are extremely suc-
cessful in large part because of their blanket licenses. As discussed
above, PROs allow licensees to pay an annual flat fee in return for the
use of any song in their repertoire. Licensees are given nearly unfettered
discretion in the type and amount of music that they play and in return
pay a relatively small percentage of their gross annual income.14' The
blanket licenses granted by the PROs are so effective that the organiza-
tions have been able to secure payments from AOL, RealNetworks, and
YouTube, among others. 42 Performing Rights Organizations like
ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC are thriving, generating $1.5 billion for
songwriters and publishers in 2007 alone. "3
Today, sound recording copyright owners are struggling to imple-
ment and expand their own performance right. With the enormous
success of musical work PROs in mind, sound recording copyright own-
ers should consider shifting their focus from terrestrial performances to
digital ones. Many Performance-Based Sites currently pay little to noth-
ing to sound recording copyright owners for user-generated content, and
it is due time to consider why not. When a physical auditorium hosts a
rock concert or sporting event on their property, for instance, a license is
139. In 1978 the Register of Copyrights found that sound recording performance royal-
ties would likely amount to "less than one-half of one percent of [the music industry's]
estimated net sales." Performance Rights in Sound Recordings, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,763, 12,764-
65 (Mar. 27, 1978).
140. The alternative set forth in this Note does not mean to suggest that the Performance
Rights Act is unjustified. Rather, the proposal identifies a more sustainable right that might
better secure sound recording royalties and ensure that performers and record labels are given
the financial incentive to continue to create new works.
141. See Gorman, supra note 14; KRASILOVSKY, supra note 11 and accompanying text.
142. See U.S. v. ASCAP, 559 F. Supp. 2d 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); U.S. v. ASCAP, 616 F.
Supp. 2d 447 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
143. Robert P. Merges, The Continuing Vitality of Music Performance Rights Organiza-
tions 2 (UNIv. OF CAL., BERKELEY SCH. OF LAW, PUB. LAW & LEGAL THEORY RESEARCH
PAPER SERIES, Paper No. 1266870, 2008), available at http://ssm.com/abstract= 1266870.
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negotiated with ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC to cover any and all musical
work performances that take place during the events. This fee is simply a
cost of doing business and provides a safe harbor against claims of copy-
right infringement. Obviously, physical auditoriums need not worry
about obtaining a sound recording performance right because no such
right exists. Online, however, one does.i Thus, in order to better connect
to the emerging performance market of which Bailwol spoke, sound re-
cording copyright owners should elicit a flat, annual performance fee
from Performance-Based Sites which regularly perform user-generated
audiovisual works that incorporate protected sound recordings on their
site. Websites like YouTube and Facebook host millions of user-uploaded
sound recording performances on their sites daily and should compen-
sate sound recording copyright holders accordingly.'45 Like terrestrial
radio, Performance-Based Sites collect advertising revenues by allowing
users to exploit the recordings of others. Unlike terrestrial radio, it is
clear that consumer trends are shifting to an online platform. Whereas
the music industry has acted decisively over the last decade to ensure
that webcasters pay their dues, many Performance-Based Sites have es-
caped any financial obligation for their performance of sound
recordings.
Performance-Based Sites currently seek shelter from copyright
claims under § 512 of the DMCA. 146 Section 512 outlines a complex
process by which Internet service providers like YouTube can be granted
safe harbor from the infringing actions of their users .' As part of this
safe harbor, the statute includes a notice and takedown procedure that
requires service providers to immediately remove any hosted files a
copyright holder identifies as infringing, notwithstanding any defensive
claims of fair use.' 48 Once the file has been removed, the burden shifts to
the user to assert his or her right to have the materials replaced.'4 9 In gen-
eral, most users have neither the determination nor the legal expertise to
contest a takedown action.
144. See Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-
39, 109 Stat. 336 (1995) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 106(6)(2008)).
145. Warner Music Group recently entered into a licensing agreement with YouTube that
covers both label-distributed music videos and user-generated content. Greg Sandoval, As
Expected Warner Music, YouTube Make Up, CNET NEWS, Sept. 29, 2009,
http://news.cnet.comI8301-1023_3-10363384-93.html. Notwithstanding such agreements,
however, the lack of a right to collect for user-generated audiovisual works means that indi-
vidual agreements must be negotiated for every Performance-Based Site. Moreover, such
arrangements do not compensate smaller sound recording copyright owners or independent
artists.
146. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2008).
147. Id.
148. See § 512 (c)(1-3).
149. § 512 (g)(3).
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Despite widespread utilization of the DMCA notice and takedown
procedures, § 512 does not proscribe private license negotiations. In-
deed, over the past few years, YouTube has struck several deals with
Sony Music Entertainment, Universal Music Group, and Warner Music
Group for use of commercially produced music videos.5 ° These ar-
rangements have resulted in varying degrees of success."5' Because most
of the user-generated content on Performance-Based Sites does not fall
within the purview of the sound recording performance right, however,
serious licensing considerations have been largely precluded. The fol-
lowing section considers precisely why sound recording copyright
owners do not currently enjoy the right to collect royalties from these
websites, and what legislative steps would be required to permit such
remuneration.
A. The Rights at Issue
Section 106(6) of the Copyright Act defines the digital sound re-
cording performance right as the right "to perform the copyrighted work
[sound recording] publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.' 52
A "digital audio transmission" is defined as "a digital transmission ...
that embodies the transmission of a sound recording. This term does not
include the transmission of any audiovisual work."'5 Thus, user-
generated clips on YouTube that present visual images in connection
with sound recordings do not qualify as digital sound recording perform-
ances under the Copyright Act. 'M In theory, audiovisual clips that
incorporate protected sound recordings require a master use license that
must be privately negotiated directly with sound recording copyright
owners.'55 But individually licensing user-generated clips on the web
presents insurmountably high transaction costs. Because of this diffi-
culty, along with the audiovisual exception to the sound recording
performance right, Performance-Based Site users have been allowed to
create and post audiovisual works that incorporate sound recordings in
150. See, e.g., Brian Stelter, Warner Music Removes Its Videos From YouTube as
Licensing Talks Stall, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2008, at B5, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/
12/22Jbusiness/media/22warner.html; Jessica E. Vascellaro, YouTube, Universal Music
Discuss Alliance, WALL ST. J., Mar. 5, 2009, at B4, http://online.wsj.comlarticle/
SB 123620507812933263.html; see also Sandoval, supra note 145.
151. See Stelter, supra note 150; Vascellaro, supra note 150.
152. 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2009).
153. 17 U.S.C. § 1140)(5).
154. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining an audiovisual work as "works that consist of a series
of related images which are intrinsically intended to be shown ... together with accompany-
ing sounds"). Additionally, a synchronization license is required from the musical work
copyright owner. KOHN & KOHN, supra note 5, at 446.
155. KRASILOVSKY, supra note 11, at 69-70.
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their entirety, placing an onerous burden on copyright holders to patrol
the web and submit takedown requests in compliance with the DMCA 56
Although the scope the performance right poses an obstacle, legisla-
tive reform is clearly not an option sound recording copyright holders
have shied away from. Instead of (or in addition to) seeking to alter the
Copyright Act via the PRA to collect from a group with a decades-old
performance exemption, sound recording copyright owners should con-
tinue to lobby for an expanded performance right online. Such a strategy
would likely be met with far less opposition than the PRA, and would
better connect to emerging (and growing) market trends online. By seek-
ing compensation from a source with deep pockets, labels may find
temporary reprieve, but they may do so at the cost of sustainable licens-
ing revenues.
As an alternative to the copyright overhaul currently being sought by
the labels, section 114(j)(5) could be amended to provide that "a 'digital
audio transmission' is a digital transmission as defined in section 101,
that embodies the transmission of a sound recording. This term does not
include any commercially distributed audiovisual work." The obvious
target of the revised statute is user-generated audiovisual works, like
those on Performance-Based Sites. By securing the right to collect from
sites that allow users to combine full-length performances of sound re-
cordings with visual images, copyright holders can ensure that digital
performances won't escape copyright protection simply because they are
combined with on-screen lyrics or images. Commercially produced and
distributed audiovisual works that have already obtained the requisite
licenses to reproduce sound recordings in connections with visual im-
ages (e.g., music videos and audiovisual advertisements) would be
unaffected by the statutory amendment.'
5 7
Moreover, the definition of a sound recording in section 101 would
need to be updated to reflect this change. As currently defined, a sound
recording does not include "the sounds accompanying a motion picture
156. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages and
Demand for Jury Trial, at 44, Viacom Int'l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 461
(S.D.N.Y 2008)(No. 07-2103)("YouTube is deliberately interfering with copyright owners'
ability to find infringing videos even after they are added to YouTube's library .... For all
these reasons, no matter how much effort and money copyright owners expend to protect their
rights, there will always be a vast collection of infringing videos available on YouTube to draw
users to its site."); see also Linda Rosencrance, Prince Fights YouTube, eBay over Copyrighted
Content, PC WORLD, Sept. 19, 2007, http://www.pcworld.com/article/137386/princejfights
_youtube ebay-over.copyrighted-content.html ("We [copyright owners] notify YouTube of
infringements and they remove the files, but it goes on ad infinitum .... Now the onus is on
artists and rights' creators to police YouTube at their expense.").
157. The wholesale upload of commercial videos by a user would not be exempted under
the revised provision. A music video posted by a user, for instance, would not be considered
"commercially distributed" for purposes of the statute.
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or other audiovisual work."'' 8 Because the definition in § 1140)(5) alters
the scope of the digital performance right granted to sound recordings,
the broader definition of a sound recording must be amended to reflect
the new audiovisual addition. Thus, a supplement to the sound recording
definition might read, "'Sound recordings' are works that result from the
fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds, but not including
the sounds accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work,
regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as disks, tapes, or
other phonorecords, in which they are embodied, except as defined in
Section 114(j)(5)."
B. The Legality of Creating a Sound Recording "PRO"
Once the right to collect is statutorily established, the issue of how to
collect royalties becomes relevant. As with musical works, the collection
of performance royalties would be nearly impossible without the help of
a collective agency. Unfortunately, establishing a sound recording collec-
tive poses several complications of its own.
Under § 114 of the Copyright Act, SoundExchange is authorized to
collectively manage and distribute digital performance royalties on be-
half of all sound recording copyright owners who join the organization. "9
Over the years, SoundExchange has developed an impressive administra-
tive framework to handle the licensing of digital sound recording
performance rights for its membership base of sound recording copy-
right holders.' 60 But SoundExchange's collective authority extends only
to those digital music performances that qualify for statutory licensing
under § 114(f) of the Copyright Act. 16' As discussed above, interactive
music providers (those which allow users to select which sound re-
cordings they wish to hear) do not qualify for statutory licensing.6 2
Because sites like YouTube, MySpace, and Facebook would likely qual-
ify as interactive services,'63 SoundExchange would not have authority
under § 114(g) to negotiate or collect performance royalties on behalf of
interactive services, even if the statute was amended as described above.
158. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
159. 17 U.S.C. § 114(g) (2-3).
160. See SoundExchange, The Law, http://soundexchange.com/about/the-law/ (last vis-
ited Dec. 23, 2009).
161. 17 U.S.C. § 114(f), (g)(3).
162. See KOHN & KOHN, supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text. An "interactive
service" is a service that, "enables a member of the public to receive... on request, a trans-
mission of a particular sound recording, whether or not as part of a' program, which is selected
by or on behalf of the recipient." 17 U.S.C. § 1140)(7).
163. See 17 U.S.C. § 1140)(7).
Fall 20091
206 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 16:179
Furthermore, § 114(e)(2)(A) significantly restricts the ability of
sound recording copyright holders to collectively manage their perform-
ance rights with interactive services.' 64 While the statute does allow
copyright owners to "designate common agents to act on their behalf'
for purposes of collecting and remitting interactive license royalties, it
goes on to require that "each copyright owner ... establish the royalty
rates and material license terms and conditions unilaterally, that is, not in
agreement, combination, or concert with other copyright owners of
sound recordings."'65 Therefore, even if there were a right to collect
royalties from Performance-Based Sites, and copyright holders gave a
collective agent the authority to collect those royalties, the agent would
be required to negotiate rates and terms on behalf of each copyright
holder independently. Realistically, this would involve separate agree-
ments on behalf of each of the big four record labels: EMI, Sony Music
Entertainment, Warner Music Group, and Universal Music Group, as
well as other represented sound recording copyright owners. A collective
would thus serve as a central intermediary negotiating the requisite per-
formance licenses between Performance-Based Sites and individual
sound recording copyright holders.' 66 Unlike the current practice, where
Performance-Based Sites like YouTube negotiate only with the largest
sound recording copyright owners, a collective agency could license the
rights to perform the works of a much larger (and continually increasing)
membership base.
Alternatively, the anti-collusion restrictions of section 1 14(e)(2)(A)
could be relaxed so as to permit collective management of interactive
sound recording transmissions. Several factors might alleviate antitrust
concerns to sufficiently justify limited collusive behavior among sound
recording copyright holders. First, and most importantly, a sound re-
cording collective would offer non-exclusive licenses, ensuring that
licenses can be obtained directly with the sound recording copyright
owner if the licensee so chooses. This practice is analogous to the per-
formance licenses offered by PROs, which permit licensees to negotiate
directly with publishers and songwriters for individual licenses in lieu of
obtaining the traditional PRO blanket license. 67 Furthermore, in Broad-
cast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcast Systems, Inc., the Supreme Court
approved the collective licensing practices of PROs, recognizing that
individual musical work copyright owners are "inherently unable to fully
164. See § 114(e)(2)(A).
165. Id.
166. The collective organization might elicit standardized rates and terms from each
licensor on the basis of the size, number of works, or other criterion.
167. KorN & KOHN, supra note 5, at 916-17.
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effectively compete" in the music licensing market.'" The Court found
that ASCAP and BMI did not violate the Sherman Act even though the
blanket licenses issued by the PROs substantially reduced interseller
price competition.'" Thus, while it is true that a sound recording per-
formance collective might similarly affect the value of interactive
performance royalties, such concern is mitigated by the non-exclusive
nature of the licenses and the inherent inability of individual sound re-
cording copyright owners to otherwise negotiate such licenses.
In sum, in order for sound recording copyright holders to collect per-
formance royalties from Performance-Based Sites they must: (1)
establish a statutory right to collect performance royalties for
user-generated audiovisual works which incorporate protected sound
recordings by amending § 1140)(5) of the Copyright Act, (2) establish a
collective agent to represent them, and (3) ensure that royalty
negotiations between that collective agent and Performance-Based sites
comply with the anti-collusion provisions of § 114(e)(2)(A) or lobby for
elimination of the anti-collusion barriers altogether.
FIGURE 3
COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF SOUND RECORDING
DIGITAL PERFORMANCE LICENSES FOR SITES WITH
INTERACTIVE AUDIOVISUAL CONTENT
YouTube
I I
Collective
Combine separately negotiated price quotes and terms
iversa Son M I LIII) Independent'
168. 441 U.S. 1,23 (1979).
169. Id.
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In consideration for paying an annual blanket fee to a sound re-
cording collective, Performance-Based Sites would be assured that
sound recording copyright owners would not invoke any § 512 or copy-
right infringement proceedings against the service or its users. 70 The
effect of such an agreement would be millions of dollars saved in admin-
istrative and legal fees by both parties.'7 ' In the midst of a billion dollar
legal battle between YouTube and Viacom for video copyright
infringement, an agreement to avoid any analogous sound recording
copyright action would likely be welcomed by the both industries. 
7
C. Consumer Benefits of an Expanded Digital Sound
Recording Performance Right
Blanket licenses for interactive sound recording performances are
beneficial not only to copyright holders and Performance-Based Sites,
but also to those members of the public seeking to post audiovisual con-
tent online. Users who post "mashups" or parody clips often integrate
sound recordings, raising legitimate fair use concerns.' But as part of
the mandatory takedown procedures of § 512, sites like YouTube argue
that they have neither the time nor legal resources to make nebulous fair
use determinations. '' Rather than consider the fair use merits of individ-
ual clips, YouTube simply removes user-posted videos when it receives a
valid takedown request, thus securing safe harbor.'75 A blanket license
granted by a collective, on the other hand, would grant Performance-
Based Site users almost unlimited latitude in posting audiovisual works
that include sound recordings. By transposing blanket license to the web,
sound recording copyright owners would be compensated for digital per-
formances of their works, Performance-Based Sites would be granted
170. The extent of this compromise would, of course, be limited to the collective
agency's membership.
171. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, supra note 146, and accompanying text.
172. See Anne Broache & Greg Sandoval, Viacom Sues Google Over YouTube Clips,
CNET NEWS, Mar. 13, 2007, http://news.cnet.com/Viacom-sues-Google-over-YouTube-
clips/2100-1030_3-6166668.html.
173. See Lawrence Lessig, In Defense of Piracy, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 2008,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122367645363324303.html ("The work of these remix crea-
tors is valuable in ways that we have forgotten. It returns us to a culture that, ironically, artists
a century ago feared the new technology of that day would destroy.").
174. See Hamilton Falk et al., John McCain and the Music Makers, COLUM. SCI. &
TECH. L. REv. BLOC, (Oct. 31, 2008), http://www.stlr.org/2008/10/john-mccain-and-the-
music-makers ("[l]awyers and judges constantly disagree about what does and does not con-
stitute fair use. No number of lawyers could possibly determine with a reasonable level of
certainty whether ... videos for which we receive disputed takedown notices qualify as fair
use.") (quoting YouTube Chief Counsel Zahavah Levine).
175. Id.
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safe harbor, and users would be allowed to freely and creatively express
themselves on the web.
Other websites that contain user-generated content would be largely
unaffected by the statutory change. For instance, an individual who posts
an audiovisual clip incorporating protected sound recordings on her per-
sonal website would clearly violate the amended digital performance
right of the copyright holder. But in such instances the response of the
copyright owner would likely be the same as it is today; namely, the
copyright owner could submit a DMCA takedown notice to the appro-
priate service provider. Unlike Performance-Based Sites, which derive
advertising revenues directly from the unauthorized performances of
millions of sound recordings, personal websites and blogs present rela-
tively little risk of sale displacement. In such circumstances, the DMCA
provides adequate safeguards to both the copyright owner and website
proprietor.
D. Fulfilling the Constitution's Promise
The Constitution explains that copyright protection exists "[t]o pro-
mote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.' 76 Thus, copyright owners
must demonstrate that sound recording performance rights, both online
and off, fulfill the constitutional mandate and "foster the growth of learn-
ing and culture for the public welfare.""' In this evaluation, Congress
should consider "how much the monopoly granted be detrimental to the
public," and whether granting the exclusive right "confers a benefit upon
the public that outweighs the evils of the temporary monopoly."'
78
As digital performances of sound recordings become increasingly
prevalent, technology has propelled performances "into the sphere of
distribution."'79 Digital performances are now directly competing against,
and substituting for, reproduction royalties, which are historically the
greatest source of revenue for sound recording copyright holders. Thus,
in order to ensure that copyright owners are sufficiently encouraged to
create or invest in new works, they must be compensated, in some new
way, for the use of their sound recordings. As one commentator has
noted, without sustainable royalties, "record companies will no longer
have an incentive to invest in the creation of new sound recordings or to
facilitate the creative efforts of their artists because there will be no
176. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
177. REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, 87TH CONG., REPORT ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF
THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW, at 5 (Comm. Print 1961).
178. Id.
179. O'Dowd, supra note 137, at 260.
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market for their prerecorded music."'"8 Moreover, studies indicate that
record labels remain highly relevant to creative expression in the era of
digital music distribution."8 ' Far from the egalitarian recording industry
some hoped the Internet would engender, music purchases are still
182highly concentrated around hit songs backed by major record labels. ,
The fundamental question that remains is how to encourage sound re-
cording copyright holders to invest in the next generation of creativity in
a digital music marketplace.
As far back as 1978, the Copyright Office recognized the need for a
public performance right in sound recordings, noting: "Sound recordings
are creative and their unauthorized performance results in both damage
and profits. To leave the creators of sound recordings without any protec-
tion or compensation for their widespread commercial use can no longer
be justified."'8 3 Moreover, history has demonstrated that compensating
creators financially fulfills a Constitutional command. The Supreme
Court has recognized the relevance of economic incentives, holding that
"the economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to
grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of in-
dividual efforts by personal gain is the best way to advance public
welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and use-
ful Arts.' '"
Ultimately, the Constitution does not mandate that sound recordings
be granted parity to any other artistic or literary works, or that any one
copyright owner receive the same compensation as any other. Rather it
requires sufficient incentive for authors to continue to create new works
for the betterment of the public welfare. What is increasingly clear is that
180. Id.; see also Melinda Newman, A&R: Squeezed by Costs. Scouts Increasingly Scour
the Net, BILLBOARD MAG., Apr. 10, 2004, at 1, 60 (discussing the new approaches to finding
talent and to nurturing talent by a record company faced with increased budget cuts).
181. See Glenn Peoples, The Long Tail: Don't Bury the Blockbuster Yet. The Most Popu-
lar Digital Tracks Account for More Sales Every Year, BILLBOARD MAG., Nov. 14, 2009,
http://www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/content-display/magazine/features/e3i35ed869fbd929ccdcca5
2ed7fd9262d3.
182. Id. ("The great hope for digital music was that it would make the recording industry
more egalitarian ... [s]o far, at least according to Nielsen SoundScan data on U.S. music sales
... that revolution hasn't arrived."); see also Chris Keall, The 'Long Tail' Myth, NAT'L Bus.
REv., Feb. 9, 2009, http://www.nbr.co.nz/opinion/chris-keall/the-long-tail-myth ("Will Page
and Gary Eggleton at the MCPS-PRS Alliance-a UK body that collects royalties for musi-
cians ... have analysed a year's worth of downloads from a well-known Internet music store.
They found that of the 13 million tracks available, 52,000-just 0.4 per cent-accounted for
80 per cent of downloads.") (quoting Richard Webb, Online Shopping and the Harry Potter
Effect, 2687 NEW SCIENTIST 52 (Dec. 20, 2008)).
183. Performance Rights In Sound Recordings: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Civil Liberties and the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong.
117 (1978).
184. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
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digital technologies have drastically undermined the ability of sound
recording copyright holders to recoup investments and provide a robust
variety of music to the public.' To right this imbalance, Congress is
constitutionally encouraged to act. Sound recording performance royal-
ties provide artists and copyright owners with enhanced incentives to
create, the benefits of which have already been recognized by Con-
gress.' In our increasingly digital society, the assumption that sound
recording copyright owners are adequately compensated by balances
struck decades ago does not pass reasonably scrutiny. This Note has at-
tempted to propose a method by which Congress can better ensure that
sound recording copyright holders are compensated in the long-term,
thereby facilitating the dissemination of artistic creations that benefit
artists and consumers alike. While the PRA may fulfill Congress' duty
today, it is questionable whether such royalties are sufficient to sustain
the creativity that Congress is entrusted to promote. For it is not terres-
trial performances that threaten the viability of the industry, but rather,
those performances which exist online, exploit sound recordings, and fail
to compensate the copyright holder. It is incumbent upon Congress to
ensure that those who host performances that increasingly substitute for
sound recording reproduction royalties compensate the copyright holders
in an equitable and sustainable manner.
CONCLUSION
Until such a solution is considered, the PRA represents the latest in a
long series of contentious proposals advocated by sound recording copy-
right owners who are continually fighting for a right that musical work
copyright owners have enjoyed for decades. History has proven that
while Congress has been receptive to these concerns, their response has
led to entirely new debates over the scope of music copyright law in the
United States. Both record labels and terrestrial broadcasters fear that the
proverbial sky is falling, and that the PRA represents either the panacea
or Pandora's Box for the music industry.
The fighters in this brawl are sophisticated heavyweights. In one
corner of the ring are record labels-an industry in distress, which has
consistently struggled to adapt to the digital music market. In the other
are the broadcasters-a media behemoth whose cries of "promotional
185. Bill Holland, Big Publishing Advances Dry Up for Most New Acts, BILLBOARD
MAG., Apr. 5, 2003, at 1, 66 (quoting Sony/ATV Music Publishing chairman Paul Russell as
saying that his company is becoming "increasingly circumspect" as "record labels are signing
fewer new artists and making fewer new recordings.").
186. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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compensation" seem increasingly unconvincing in our digital world.
Standing on the sidelines are music fans that rely more and more on
digital performances, unknowingly thinning record label wallets, and
perhaps stalling creativity, in the process.
Fighting their own battles are the webcasters, small and large, con-
tinuously opposing the royalty determinations of the CRB. For over ten
years, sound recording copyright owners and webcasters have faced off
in appellate proceedings and Congressionally-mandated negotiations,
with webcasters continuously threatening to shut their doors for good.
And yet despite these difficulties, the PRA seeks to add terrestrial broad-
casters to the growing list of media outlets which must submit to the
judgment of the Copyright Royalty Board. If the messy battles waged
between record labels and webcasters over statutory royalties provide
any precedent, terrestrial stations may face an altogether new brawl if the
PRA passes.
